implied by stock option grants, the dilution that materializes upon exercises will produce negative abnormal returns. Since, as we con…rm, it is relatively easy to forecast exercises, we can predict these negative returns if the market is less than e¢ cient. We are able to identify stocks that subsequently exhibit signi…cant negative abnormal returns as measured using the CAPM, 3-and 4-factor Fama-French models, as well as industry benchmarks. We also …nd that …rms with high imminent option dilution tend to show reversals of positive returns. The evidence we uncover here is consistent with investors exhibiting both limited attention and information processing power.
Introduction
The issue of how well investors incorporate into stock prices the information disclosed by …rms is an open and vigorously debated question. It has been put forward that the form of the information disclosure -whether the relevant item is recognized in earnings or disclosed in the footnotescan play an important role. For instance, many value-relevant disclosures are not captured in the Income Statement or Balance Sheet, and are subsequently referred to broadly as "o¤-balance sheet"liabilities. With fully rational and sophisticated market participants, the form of disclosure is irrelevant -sophisticated (or informationally-savvy) investors should incorporate the information regardless of its form. However, in experimental work, Libby, Bloom…eld and Nelson (2001) …nd that both sophisticated and naive investors show systematic biases in their interpretation of accounting data that ultimately a¤ect asset prices. In theoretical work, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) provide a formal analysis of how investors with both limited attention and information processing power can result in market mispricing of disclosed information.
In the controversy over o¤-balance sheet liabilities and potentially in ‡ated earnings reports, the granting and disclosure of employee stock options have taken pride of place (see The Economist Center (2002) reports that just over 14% of the equity of the average S&P 500 …rm has been promised to employees through stock option plans. 1 Turning to disclosure, under U.S. accounting rules prior to June 2005, stock option grants were not expensed, not recorded on balance sheets, but only partially re ‡ected in diluted Earnings Per Share. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) consider the disclosure of stock option grants explicitly and suggest that when these items are disclosed in footnotes but not recognized in earnings, overvaluation of the …rm's stock occurs, causing a relation between the dollar magnitude of the grant and subsequent abnormal stock returns. More importantly, the heated controversy led to FAS 123R, a stark revision to FAS 123 from 1993, under which, starting from June 2005, …rms are required to report the fair market value of all stock-related grants against their earnings. 2 1 The Economist (2000) reports that the Black-Scholes value of employee stock option grants in 1999 was just over 6% of the earnings of an average S&P 500 …rm. Core and Guay (2001) document that the Black-Scholes value of employee stock options average almost 4% of the market capitalization of the average large corporation, with values at the upper end of the spectrum approaching 24%. Sanford F. Bernstein & Co estimates that if option grants had been expensed, pro…t growth for the S&P 500 over 1997 through 2001 would drop from 9% to 6% (see Morgensen (2002) ). 2 For public institutions (other than small business issuers), a recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) action makes revised FASB Statement No. 123, Share-Based Payment (FAS 123R), e¤ective at the beginning of the entity's …rst …scal year that begins after June 15, 2005 . For small public institutions (small business issuers), the new requirements are e¤ective at the beginning of the entity's …rst …scal year that begins after December 15, 2005 . For privately held institutions, the e¤ective date is at the beginning of the entity's …rst …scal year that begins after December 15, 2005 (January 1, 2006, for calendar year-end institutions). Bartov and Hayn (2007) examine whether Our primary interest in this paper is whether market prices fully account for the dilution of employee stock options. 3 If prices do not re ‡ect the potential dilution of options in full, it should then be possible to devise a pro…table stock selection strategy based on public information. Jenkins (2002) states the case with much stronger language:
Myth: Failing to deduct an expense for management stock options in ‡ated earnings and therefore stock prices. Good grief. We've been discussing this rule change for a decade now. It would be the overripe short-selling opportunity of the century if the market were somehow fooled into mispricing stocks simply because we failed to adopt a particular accounting treatment for the non-cash value of options.
Similarly, in Wikipedia.com we …nd:
According to US GAAP in e¤ect before June 2005, stock options granted to employees did not need to be charged as an expense on the income statement when granted, although the cost was disclosed in the notes to the accounts. This allows a potentially large form of employee compensation to not show up as an expense in the current year, and therefore, currently overstate income. Many assert that over-reporting of income by methods such as this by American corporations was one contributing factor in the Stock Market Downturn of 2002.
To explore whether investors are able to fully process option-relevant information in footnotes, rather than as recognized in earnings, we formulate an investment strategy test under the assumption that investors e¤ectively disregard at least a portion of the costs of stock option grants. 4 An obvious implied trading strategy is to short or downweight …rms with large amounts of employee options outstanding, but Yermack (1997) and Ittner, et al (2002) …nd that …rms tend to perform somewhat better than expected in the year following large option grants. Our contention is that if investors neglect option dilution, there is no reason to expect any correction in the subsequent this change had incremental valuation e¤ects.year since no additional information about the option grant will emerge. The unaddressed question is exactly when investors realize the costs of options and drive prices back to fundamentals. 5 There is likely to be at least one lag that generates negative abnormal returns even if option costs are appropriately priced. To avoid such data-snooping issues, we restrict attention to testing the proposition that prices do not re ‡ect option costs until they materialize upon exercise by employees and the additional shares are issued.
An active investor wishing to exploit mispricing of option dilution obviously cannot use hindsight to identify when prices are corrected. In fact, she must use forecasted option exercises, rather than realized option exercises used by Carpenter and Remmers (2001) , Huddart and Lang (2002) and Bartov and Maohanram (2004) . Their research can ascertain whether executives made well-timed trades based on their own information, but it is mute on the question of market e¢ ciency unless the market is sluggish in its reaction to the revelation of an insider sale. 6 By contrast, we use public information to forecast future exercises and form annual portfolios in anticipation of the costs of such exercises, which we term "imminent dilution." This empirical strategy is sensible for two reasons. First, the exact date at which employees exercise is only available for the top executives in the …rm. This data constraint precludes the use of an event-study methodology. Second, even if we were to use a longer estimation window, the results would be biased because employees will only exercise their options if the stock has performed well enough to place the options at least in the money.
To predict the year in which employee exercise will take place, we rely on a typical schedule in which 25% of a given grant vests in each of the four years following the grant. We then follow results documented in existing research on the decision to exercise such options (see Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) ). 7 We also present evidence that our predictions conform reasonably well with the appearance of the proceeds to the …rm (number of options exercised times exercise price) on company balance sheets.
To estimate the costs of imminent option exercises, we use Standard and Poor's ExecuComp year-end data for each of the years 1992 to 2005, and implement our trading strategy over the subsequent years 1994 to 2007. We use all options granted by the end of 2005 to calculate our estimate of the unrecognized cost of stock options by year-end 2006. We estimate a systematic negative 5 See DeLong, et al (1990) for an example of a research design that seeks to identify how quickly market mispricing is corrected. 6 See Seyhun (1998) for an exhaustive treatment of the investment value of insider trading disclosures. 7 In our empirical analysis of how well our predicted exercises explain changes in realized exercises as they appear in book values of equity (see Table 3 ), we document successes for both this "25%-per-year" vesting schedule and for "three-year-cli¤"-vesting schedules which allow for 100% of the options to vest after three years. relationship between abnormal returns and our measure of the unrecognized cost of employee stock options. This relationship is both economically and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level or better under the CAPM, 3-factor and 4-factor Fama-French models (Fama and French (1993) ), and industry benchmarks.
While the return results are statistically signi…cant, we also provide an additional test of the idea that stock market participants were unpleasantly surprised by stock option dilution. We show that if news about …rm fundamentals are revealed before employees exercise their options, there will be systematic reversals of positive returns for …rms with high imminent option dilution. We …nd evidence of just such reversals in our data for the same 1994-2006 time period. These reversals, however, no longer hold up in 2007, suggesting that perhaps investors became more acutely aware of these costs in response to the accounting change.
Going forward, it certainly remains an open question whether the abnormal returns we document will persist into the future, especially after the full e¤ects of expensing stock options (FAS 123R) kicks in. There is a feature of our results that suggest some correction may have taken place during our sample period. What we …nd is that the market reaction to option dilution is actually greater than would be the case if the market merely recognized the increase in shares outstanding. That is, a …rm's price seems to correct not only for the options that are exercised, but also for some of the options that may be exercised in the future. Our …ndings for the year 2007 are certainly consistent with such corrections having already occurred. That said, the question of how the form of disclosure a¤ects the incorporation of such value-relevant events should certainly remain an interesting one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 restates the relevant empirical predictions of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) , as well as the assumptions required for our trading rule to work. It also summarizes our data and how we put together our stock selection rule. Section 3 analyzes the performance of our trading rule. In Section 4 we report our additional evidence on return reversals and Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Strategy: Prediction, Data and our Trading Rule
In this section, we begin by laying out a bare-bones model to capture the key theoretical prediction of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) . Next, we discuss our data sources and our procedure for stock selection that underlies our trading rule. We then test and con…rm our ability to predict imminent stock option exercises. With our estimates of the cost of imminent option dilution in hand, we summarize our data along with our procedure for calculating abnormal stock returns. Lastly in this section, we provide strong evidence of our ability to accurately predict actual option exercises.
A Simpli…ed Hirshleifer-Teoh (2003) Model
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) provide a rich theoretical analysis of how the presentation form of a …rm's information disclosures a¤ects market prices when investors have limited attention and information processing power. Below we sketch out a very simple framework to …x ideas in regard to the main intuition of their prediction.
Consider an all-equity …rm with n shares outstanding plus m identical employee stock options, each with an exercise price X. We consider a simple two-date model. The …rst date corresponds to the time that we make our stock selections, at which point all parties agree that the value of the …rm's operations is given by V 0 and that …rm value at the second (and terminal) date is given
n . The commonly-held prior belief of the probability that V 1 = V H is given by q H 2 (0; 1), and that V 1 = V L is given by q L = 1 q H . At the terminal date, employees can exercise their options and will choose to do so if their options are in the money (occurring when V 1 = V H > nX). While the results in this section hold for any distribution of terminal values, in our empirical work we will e¤ectively assume that it is log-normal because we use the Black-Scholes-Merton formula (Black and Sholes (1973) and Merton (1973) ) to approximate the value of options.
Denote by P 0 the stock price at the initial date and denote the stock price at the terminal date by P 1 . If options expire out of the money (V 1 = V L ), there will be only n shares outstanding so
If by contrast options expire in the money (V 1 = V H ), the shareholders receive a cash infusion of mX, but must also issue m additional shares, thus P 1 (in) V H +mX n+m . 8 Our interest in this paper is whether the market properly anticipates the costs of stock options, so our attention is focused on the initial price P 0 . Since the expected market rate of return is assumed zero, a price that appropriately anticipates stock option costs along with the distribution of returns simply equals the expected value of the terminal price. Since the terminal price is
n+m otherwise, we can write the price that correctly anticipates option dilution as
8 Since employees' gains upon exercise are a tax-deductible expense to the …rm, strictly speaking we should add back the tax rate times (P X)
and then solve for P . Doing so complicates the algebra without any signi…cant change to any of the results or empirical predictions.
Observe that P 0 in our model requires knowledge of the number of options granted m and the exercise price X. In practice, these values have in fact been reported at the option grant date in footnotes of annual reports since 1992. The costs are not, however, integrated into …rm earnings at the grant date, nor is the evolving liability recorded on the balance sheet. An extreme view would be that the market completely ignores stock option costs, in which case the initial price would simply be given by
That is, the market anticipates that in the good state of the world (where V 1 = V H ), the value of the …rm is distributed only over the original n shareholders. However, since the options are in-the-money in this state, they will be exercised and the terminal price will actually be given by 
]; see, for instance, Core, et al (2000) . Put into valuation terms, FAS 128 assumes that if options are currently not in the money, then there is no option dilution, while if they are currently in the money, the options will be immediately exercised. 9 Following this logic we de…ne:
Our simple model yields the ordering of P 0 < P misled
Clearly, the above price in equation (2) does not correctly incorporate the expected cost of option exercises as is done in equation (1) . It assumes that either the options will never be exercised or they will always be exercised. Our purpose in this section is to derive the empirical implications of a world where investors are misled by the accounting treatment of stock options to systematically underestimate their cost.
These two di¤erent anticipated price paths from P 0 and P misled 0 are illustrated in Panels A and B of Figure 1 , where Panels A and B capture the cases when options begin out-of-the-money and in-the-money, respectively. This framework then yields the following testable prediction. This implication is a direct consequence of our assumption that P misled (1) Under a no-expensing regime in which the expected cost of employee option compensation is not expensed at the time at which the options are granted:
The market overvalues the …rm relative to fundamental value, implying negative long-run abnormal stock returns.
Our Empirically-Testable Prediction e¤ectively characterizes expected returns, conditioning only on the characteristics of the stock option grant (m and X). While we report results with raw returns in our empirical section, we focus on market-adjusted returns to each stock to isolate underperformance from any correlation between stock option costs and systematic risk factors. In 1 0 Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) also provide an opposite prediction for the situation in which the expected option costs are fully expensed at the time of granting, resulting in …rms being undervalued. However, current U.S. accounting standards only now require such full expensing (i.e., for essentially …scal year 2006 and beyond), this prediction remains not fully tested. addition to the relationship between raw and risk-adjusted returns and option values, it is also possible to estimate expected returns conditional on observing option exercises. Such a test would not address the question of whether or not the market appropriately prices the costs of employee stock options, because employees will exercise only if V 1 > X. That is, we expect to see a positive relationship between employee stock option exercises and prior stock market performance, even if investors had overvalued the …rm by neglecting the fact that employees will share in good stock price performance. 11 The more important implication of Empirically-Testable Prediction is that the stocks of …rms with large amounts of expected option exercises will perform worse than they otherwise would have, and operationally this means that they will underperform their market-based benchmarks.
There are two key empirical issues that our simple two-date model does not address. The …rst is the choice of the initial period. This is arbitrary in theory. To re ‡ect accounting reality, however, we have to recognize that P Acc refers to the price at the end of the last …scal year since this is the price that is used in computing the most recent version of diluted EPS. The second timing issue is the terminal point. In the model, the ending point is the date that the employees exercise their options. The contractual maturity of most employee stock options is 10 years. Thus, if employees behave according to risk-neutral option pricing, we would observe exercises before 2007 only for those …rms that grant options prior to 1997, grant options with maturities less than 10 years, and for those with extremely high dividend payouts. It is, however, well known that employees exercise grants soon after vesting if the option is in the money (see Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999)). Indeed, FAS 123 requires …rms to disclose in footnotes (not earnings) the Black-Scholes value of option grants but leaves them free to assume maturity dates far less than the contractual maturity in so doing.
Our model does not endogenize early exercises (see Meulbroek (2001) and Hall and Murphy (2000) for models that do so based on employees'lack of diversi…cation), but the model is consistent with this practice. Empirically, we interpret X from our model more generally as the per-share level of …rm value (say V ) at which the employee chooses to exercise. In the real-world with early exercises, if the actual value at the end of a period before maturity falls below V , it does not mean that the option actually expires out of the money. Rather, it means that the option remains alive to be potentially exercised in subsequent periods. We now turn to the construction of our stock selection rule to delineate exactly how we deal with these issues.
Data and the Stock-Selection Procedure
Our stock selections are based on employee option information from Standard and Poor's ExecuComp, combined with market data from CRSP. ExecuComp reports key information about option grants to executives for the S&P 1500 …rms (comprised of the S&P 500, the S&P Midcap, and the S&P Smallcap) starting in 1992. The database covers at most nine executives (although most companies do report only …ve) and reports the percentage of total option grants to all employees in a given year represented by a given executive option grant. 12 ExecuComp also provides summary information on options granted before 1992, but only for the top …ve executives; there are no data on the scale of grants to all employees before that date. For the grant data starting in 1992, we assume that other employees have options with the same exercise price as the executives, which amounts to assuming that they receive their grants at the same time. For most …rms in our sample, this is su¢ cient. However, slightly over 30% of the …rms in our sample made multiple grants to the CEO and/or to other executives. We assume that employees receive grants in the same proportion as all the executives covered in ExecuComp. That is, the grants reported in ExecuComp are assumed to be a scale replica of the total option grants at their …rm. Thus, for each reported grant given to each executive, we are able to compute the total number of shares of options granted to the entire …rm based on the information available in ExecuComp.
Our trading rule also requires an estimate of when employees exercise their options, and the associated costs to shareholders. Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) both document spikes in employee exercises at options'vesting dates if they are in the money. We make our stock selections at the beginning of each year and can only use information at that time.
The expected negative abnormal return is just equal to the unrecognized cost of the options, scaled by the current market value of the …rm's equity. To estimate the unrecognized cost we use the Black-Scholes-Merton value less the intrinsic value of the options (adjusted by the …rm's earnings) at the end of the …scal year. Since our selections are made for a given year, we also assume a maturity of one year in computing our Black-Scholes-Merton values. Obviously, more frequent selections would increase the power of our tests, but the underlying option data is only annual. 1 2 Thanks to Wayne Guay for originally bringing this data item to our attention.
Predicting Imminent Option Exercises
Our primary rule for computing what we term imminent dilution costs is computed as follows. To simplify the illustration, we use the options granted in …scal-year 1992 as an example. 13 In 1992, we take the number of options, n 1992 , and the exercise price of options granted, X 1992 , for each grant of each …rm, and then look forward to the end of the next …scal year in which we assume one quarter of the option grant will …rst vest. We compute the intrinsic value version of the dollar option cost as the maximum of zero and the di¤erence between the stock price at the end of the …rm's …scal 1993 and the exercise price. This number, scaled by market capitalization and adjusted by earnings, is 1993's contribution to diluted earnings per share computed according to FAS 128 (see Core, Guay, and Kothari (2000)). Our forecast of the imminent dilution (ID) that will take place at the beginning of 1994 computes the Black-Scholes-Merton value of options granted in 1992 and valued at the end of 1993, minus the intrinsic value. A one-year maturity is assumed. More formally, for each grant of each …rm we compute
where C() is the Black-Scholes-Merton formula adapted for the payment of continuous dividends, Our procedure is similar for subsequent years: we use one-fourth of the options granted in 1993
plus an additional one-fourth of the options granted in 1992 to form our portfolios for 1995, and so forth. The di¤erence as we move beyond 1992 is that we track whether options granted in 1992 did in fact come in the money in 1994. If the maximum stock price in 1994 did not exceed the exercise price of options granted in 1992, we also include the options used to compute imminent dilution above (ID 1994 ) to compute our imminent dilution that will take place at the beginning of 1995 (ID 1995 ). Formally, at the end of …scal 1994 we save the maximum stock price during the …scal year, P M ax 1994 , and the associated indicator variable:
We then compute imminent dilution for 1995 as 
If again the 1992 options did not fall in the money, we retain them for the following year. To generalize, if any previously vested options are not exercised in one year because they are never in the money, they will be carried over to the following year until the expiration date. Some options in our data do get dropped in later years because we have a 15-year window and most options have a 10-year maturity. We then sum up the imminent dilution of each grant for each …rm-year.
The above procedure embodies an assumption that options vest 25% per year after they are granted, and that employees exercise such options in the …rst year they are vested and in the money. Both assumptions are only a rough approximation of reality. Some options vest 33% per year over three years and some have cli¤ vesting at 4 years, and the exact schedule is not reported on ExecuComp. Our portfolio choices are not overly sensitive to the precise assumptions we make about vesting and exercise. In the next section, we show that our estimates are also strongly related to actual (realized) option exercises.
We use the actual expiration dates of the options when available, but nearly 75% of all options in the data have an expiration date exactly ten years after they were granted. In the event that the option expiration is unavailable, we assume it to be 10 years. If a certain grant of options has a maturity less than 4 years, say T < 4, we accelerate the vesting schedule by assuming 1=T of the grant is vested during each of the T years following the grant. All options expire out-ofmoney if they are not exercised ten years after the grant date. We are not concerned about options with a maturity longer than 10 years since less than 3% of the options fall into this category.
The adjustment in computation can be easily done and again our results are not sensitive to such changes.
Due to the assumed schedule of vesting and exercises and data availability through …scal-year Table 1A summarizes the raw data for the years 1994 to 2007. We begin with our estimates of annual simple/continuously-compounded return which is the …rm's simple/continuously compounded return over the respective year. The volatility for each …rm's stock returns is estimated using the previous …ve years of monthly data. The beta estimates in Table 1A come from a regression of continuously-compounded, …rm-speci…c monthly returns minus the T-bill return on the valueweighted CRSP index returns less the T-bill return from January 1994 through December 2007. 14 The basic option dilution values in the sixth row of and has a median value of nearly 1% (see Table 1B ), so in this portion of the sample the e¤ects should be non-trivial. Finally, since most of the data items are skewed or have some outliers, in our analyses going forward, we winsorize the variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles except that we use continuously compounded stock returns to deal with the skewness and asymmetry of simple returns. In Table 1B , we present a mirror image of summary statistics solely for the …rms that appear in the top decile of imminent dilution. As can be seen there, …rms in the top decile tend to be smaller, have higher betas, and deliver signi…cantly lower and more volatile stock returns.
Descriptive Statistics and Calculation of Abnormal Returns
Abnormal return in Tables 1A and 1B is the di¤erence between the …rm's actual annual continuously compounded return and its expected return. Our abnormal returns are estimated according 1 4 Our sample period is constrained by the fact that option grant data are not electronically available before 1992. Observe that it is still possible to use historical stock return information to estimate factor sensitivities. For example, we could use data from well before 1994 to estimate exposures in 1994. However, it is well-known (see, for example, Murphy (1999)) that stock option grants have become increasingly important over time. Employee stock options give workers a claim on equity value that is more valuable as the value of the underlying equity increases. Thus, the shareholders'claim is more sensitive to market-wide factors in "down"-markets (when employees are unlikely to share in …rm value) than in "up"-markets. The consequence is that if we were for example to use betas estimated over 1991 to 1995 for our returns in 1996, we would tend to systematically overstate the betas for …rms that made heavy use of options because 1996 was an "up" market year. This would in turn lead us to falsely conclude that heavy option users underperform in "up" markets and outperform in "down" markets. To counter this problem, we estimate our factor exposures and abnormal returns using contemporaneous data to capture the risk-e¤ects of stock options.
to four standard procedures: (1) CAPM-adjusted, (2) 3-factor-adjusted (Fama-French 3 factors, i.e., the market, small …rm, and market-to-book factors), (3) 4-factor-adjusted (Fama-French 3 factors plus the momentum factor), and (4) industry-adjusted. As a preview to our more systematic tests, one can see that the average abnormal returns generated from single-and multi-factor models are signi…cantly more negative in the highest dilution subsample as compared to the full sample.
Each …rm's intra-year return reversal is measured by the di¤erence between the actual annual continuously compounded return and the return the …rm would have had if it had closed the year at its highest price during the given …scal year. We can also see that the highest dilution subsample presents a much higher (i.e., more negative) average return reversal than the full sample. Table 2 presents some of the key correlations in our database using annual data. The stock return data are for the year after the option dilution measures are computed. The main …nding is that both annual return and return reversal are negatively and signi…cantly correlated with our imminent dilution measure. There is a weaker negative relationship between these returns and the intrinsic value portion of the option's cost that is re ‡ected in diluted earnings per share. Investors and analysts seem to account for this portion of option cost better, arguably because it is re ‡ected in diluted earnings per share.
The other correlations are unsurprising. High imminent dilution …rms tend to be smaller and have a higher stock return volatility. The latter e¤ect obtains not only because high-volatility …rms tend to grant more options, but also because high volatility increases the unrecognized cost component of the stock options'value. While raw volatility is not a theoretically sound risk factor for widely traded …rms, all the results below hold after controlling for its e¤ects in addition to the Fama-French and momentum factors, as well as the …rm's industry return.
Actual Versus Predicted Option Exercise
Our test of whether the market anticipates option dilution has power only if we predict such dilution using publicly available data. Table 3 provides some evidence on the accuracy of our exercise predictions. Option exercises for employees below the top …ve executives are not available on ExecuComp, but we can trace the e¤ects of such exercises on companies'book equity. 15 Speci…cally, when an employee exercises an option, the company receives the exercise price for the option while the employee receives a new share. Thus, book equity should increase according to our exercise price times the predicted number of options exercised at that price. To compute the latter, we multiply the number of options that we deem exercisable (those vested and not previously in the money if vested for more than one year) by the hedge ratio from the option pricing formula in equations (3) or (4). This automatically adjusts for both volatility and the extent to which options begin the year in the money.
From the descriptive statistics it should be clear that for most …rms, option exercises account for a small fraction of the changes in book equity. Our tests therefore control for identi…able changes from retained earnings. There are two sources of error in the linkage of book equity to predicted option exercises. The …rst is from asset revaluations, which change book equity without any cash in ‡ow or out ‡ow. The second is that some …rms use what is called "cashless exercise" whereby employees simply receive the di¤erence between the exercise price and the price at exercise without cash coming from the employee.
The …rst set of results in Table 3 estimate the e¤ect of predicted option exercises on dollar changes in book equity (i.e., net income less dividends plus net equity issues). The coe¢ cient on changes in book equity has the expected e¤ect: signi…cantly di¤erent from zero and close to one (0.916 in our …rst speci…cation). Some di¤erence from one here is not surprising since Table 3 scales all variables except stock returns by lagged assets, since dollar book equity changes are strongly a¤ected by …rm size. The conclusion that our predictions of option exercises are quite good continues to hold (coe¢ cient is not only greater than zero, but in the …rst speci…cation is not signi…cantly di¤erent from one). 16 We now turn to the empirical performance of our stock-selection strategy using these predicted option exercise values.
Do Imminent Option Exercises Generate Negative Abnormal
Returns?
In this section we seek to test the primary empirically-testable hypothesis of the paper of whether imminent dilution owing to stock option exercises by employees leads to underperformance. A standard approach for empirically testing for the e¤ects of imminent dilution would involve the formation of portfolios. The default would be to take an equal-weighted long position in …rms in the lowest dilution decile, funded by a short position in …rms in the highest decile. Observe that the reason for analyzing portfolios rather than individual stocks is to reduce noise in the estimation of factor exposures and abnormal returns. While our empirical results are similar under this approach, the distribution of imminent dilution in our sample makes such a strategy misleading.
As can be seen from Table 1A , the median …rm has extremely small imminent dilution, and the value falls below 0.1% of market capitalization once we leave the top decile. Thus, essentially all …rms outside the top decile are viable candidates for the long "non-dilution" portfolio, and the Consequently, we focus our empirical attention on the full panel of individual stock returns in the hope of gaining a deeper understanding of the e¤ects of option dilution on abnormal returns. Of course, the residuals from our estimation procedure over this panel may be correlated across years for a given …rm or across …rms for a given year (see Petersen (2008) ). To cope with the acrossyear correlations, we estimate robust standard errors clustered within …rms. These results are contained in Table 4 . In Table 5 , we implement the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach to deal with the across-…rm time e¤ects of our panel data set. Using both approaches, and across the spectrum of underlying asset pricing models of expected returns, we uncover strong evidence that imminent dilution is negatively related to a …rm's abnormal stock return, consistent with the prediction of Hirshleifer and Seoh (2003).
Stock-Speci…c Results
Our …rst set of formal tests of the above prediction involves regressing both annual and monthly abnormal …rm stock returns, respectively, on our estimates of imminent dilution and a host of control variables. Our control variables include the natural logarithm of the …rm's market capitalization, its book-to-market ratio, and the volatility of its monthly stock returns of the previous …ve years. The latter control is included because of evidence in Easley, Hvidkjaer and O'Hara (2002) that higher raw volatility is associated with negative abnormal returns. Not surprisingly, our option dilution measures are positively related to volatility and so it is important to control for any performance that is driven solely by volatility. Following Petersen (2008), we also estimate robust standard errors, allowing for clustering within …rms. We rely on four types of abnormal return estimates for our tests, including CAPM-, 3-factor-, 4-factor-, and industry-adjusted abnormal returns. These four benchmarks can be found in Panels A, B, C, and D of Table 4 , respectively.
In each of these panels, annual returns underlie the estimates in columns (I) -(III), and monthly returns form the basis for the results in columns (IV) -(VI). Lastly, in columns (II), (III), (V),
and (VI), we also control for both year and 2-digit SIC …xed e¤ects for robustness.
Turning …rst to Panel A, we seek to estimate the relationship between a …rm's imminent dilution and its abnormal return. As can be seen in column (I), a 1% increase in a …rm's imminent dilution is associated with a -7.40% CAPM-adjusted abnormal return. This coe¢ cient is economically quite large, and is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. Importantly, as seen in column (II), this result is robust to controlling for both industry and year e¤ects as the estimated coe¢ cient on imminent dilution there of -7.95% reveals. The economic and statistical signi…cance remains when we look at monthly data, as evidenced by the coe¢ cients of -0.57% and -0.61% in columns (IV) and (V), respectively. More importantly, the result that greater imminent option dilution is associated with more negative abnormal returns is fully robust to our alternative methods of measuring abnormal Observe that for all four abnormal return measures, and for both annual and monthly data, the estimated coe¢ cient on this interaction is positive.
Moreover, in the case of CAPM-and industry-adjusted abnormal returns, this positive coe¢ cient estimate is signi…cant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. In the case of 4-factor-adjusted abnormal returns, the coe¢ cient estimated using monthly data is signi…cant at the 10% level. The evidence is at least indicative of a structural break.
Fama-MacBeth Results
We now present results for traditional Fama-MacBeth regressions. Table 5 summarizes, respectively, the results of running 14 annual and 168 monthly cross-sectional regressions of abnormal stock returns on our imminent dilution measure and a host of controls. These controls, similar to the tests in Table 4 , include the natural logarithm of the …rm's market capitalization, its bookto-market ratio, volatility of its monthly stock returns of the previous …ve years, and 2-digit SIC industry …xed e¤ects. Each cell of Table 5 contains the mean and standard error of the annual (Panel A) and respectively, monthly (Panel B ) regression coe¢ cients on imminent dilution, where each coe¢ cient is weighted according to its precision as advocated by Fama (1998) . Observe that we estimate the impact of imminent dilution on …rm performance using all four measures of abnormal returns.
Turning …rst to the annual estimates in Panel A, column (I) reveals that for each 1% increase in imminent dilution, …rms deliver on average a CAPM-adjusted abnormal return of negative 8.3%. This result is clearly economically signi…cant and is statistically signi…cant at the 1%, a result that holds up no matter how we measure abnormal returns. As evidence of the strength and consistency of these results, the 3-factor-adjusted abnormal return delivers the smallest economic relationship, but the abnormal return here is still negative 5.8% for a 1% increase in imminent dilution. Analogous results are found when we use monthly abnormal returns, as revealed in Panel B. The results consistently support the hypothesis that the market is negatively surprised by the extent of option exercises and the associated dilution. The average coe¢ cients are all negative and strongly signi…cant even in the case where we only have 14 annual coe¢ cients. However, the point estimates here and in Table 4 pose somewhat of a puzzle. Since our imminent dilution measure is computed as a fraction of total …rm value, abnormal stock returns should be reduced one-for-one with higher imminent dilution. Our annual point estimates and the annualized monthly estimates are both on the order of negative six to negative eight. Thus, the e¤ects are larger than theory suggests, and this conclusion is only strengthened by the tax-deductibility of option exercises to the …rm so the expected coe¢ cient should be closer to negative 0.7. We present a possible explanation in the next section along with additional evidence on the sources of the abnormal returns.
Columns (II) and (III) of

Additional Test: Intra-Year Return Reversals
The results thus far are consistent with the hypothesis that stock markets are surprised by the dilution from employee stock options in a way that was exploitable using publicly available information. Moreover, both sets of our tests suggest that the e¤ect is larger than is consistent with simple dilution. To address these issues, this section ties our estimated e¤ects to surprises about fundamentals.
Our simple model assumes that the revelation of information about the fundamental value of the stock and the opportunity for employees to exercise their options all happen simultaneously, at the terminal date. Of course, fundamental information and the exercises of vested options can occur at essentially any time. Moreover, as documented by Huddart and Lang (2002) , employees tend to exercise their options after the revelation of good information about the …rm. To incorporate this into our model in the simplest possible way, we assume that the realization of …rm value (V H or V L ) occurs at date 1, whereas the options can't be exercised until date 2. We then need to amend Panel A of Figure 1 as follows in Figure 3 . The implication is clear. If the market does not take account of the costs of option dilution, …rms with high imminent dilution will tend to show reversals of good fortune. To capture such reversals, we contrast the return the …rm actually provided in each …rm-year with the returns it would have had if it closed the year at its highest price for the year, where all prices are adjusted for dividends and stock splits. Speci…cally, we compute actual returns and subtract out the maximum possible return that could have been earned over the year if an investor sold out at the highest price during the year. Thus, a greater return reversal is a more negative number by our measure. The existing literature on return reversals (see DeBondt and Thaler (1987) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) has found that reversals tend to occur at longer intervals than a year, and our intra-year reversal measure shows a signi…cantly positive relationship to past stock returns (i.e., the higher the past stock returns, the less negative the return reversals). Similarly, return reversals are smaller for …rms with greater market value and/or greater book-to-market ratios. Return volatility, on the other hand, has an opposite and more compelling relationship to our reversal measure; a more volatile stock will reach greater heights during any period, for any level of realized return. 17 All our reported results control for volatility and the negative and highly signi…cant coe¢ cient con…rms a larger reversal as the stock is more volatile.
Similar to the analysis above, we report our results here over the full sample of 1994-2007 (Table   6A ) and then with the addition of an interaction e¤ect for the year 2007 (Table 6B ) , respectively.
The …rst column of Table 6A is an OLS speci…cation with controls for 2-digit SIC and year e¤ects along with the natural logarithm of market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and stock return This is consistent with the form of information disclosure playing a role in security pricing. Second, the results contained in Table 6B further con…rm the complementary prediction of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) that suggests full option expensing will lead to undervaluation of the …rm and positive long-run abnormal stock returns. 1 7 As before, volatility is measured by using the previous …ve years of monthly returns.
Concluding Remarks
One early explanation for the popularity of employee stock options as a compensation tool is their "favorable" accounting treatment, in that the accounting costs tend to understate the true economic costs. Such considerations should be irrelevant to a manager interested in maximizing …rm value in a setting where market participants can see through the accounting treatment. The work of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) , among others, suggests that investors may be unable to see through this treatment as readily as one might expect. Our empirical results suggest that the stock market tends to undervalue the costs of employee stock options until such costs are realized.
The aggressive use of employee stock options may thus represent a transfer of wealth from longterm to short-term shareholders. They also suggest that …rms that have recently granted a large amount of employee stock options will tend to be overvalued. We …nd some preliminary evidence on the mitigation of such mispricing since the revised accounting standards were implemented, but whether employee stock options' dilution e¤ect on …rms' stock returns is fully corrected a la the The following table contains summary statistics for our key variables across the years 1994-2007 for our estimation sample, including only those …rms whose …scal years end in December. Shares Outstanding and Market Capitalization of each …rm's equity, Annual Dividend Yield, Book-to-Market ratio, and (Book) Leverage Ratio are calculated at the beginning of each …rm's …scal year. The intrinsic value of options is calculated at the beginning of each …rm's …scal year and given by the maximum of zero and the di¤erence between the stock price at the beginning of the …rm's …scal year t and the exercise price. This value, scaled by Market Capitalization and adjusted for whether Net Income is positive, is year t's contribution to diluted earnings per share computed according to FAS 128, and denoted below as Intrinsic Value of Options as a % of Market Capitalization. Imminent Dilution is the di¤erence between the Black-Scholes value of options granted in previous years that have vested (valued at the beginning of year t, assuming a one-year maturity) and the intrinsic value of the options at the beginning of year t, scaled by the …rm's market capitalization. Annual Simple/Continuously Compounded Return is the …rm's simple/continuously compounded return over the year t. The Beta is estimated from an OLS regression of the monthly continuously compounded excess return on the monthly continuously compounded excess return of the CRSP value-weighted index over 1994-2007. The Volatility for each …rm's stock returns is estimated using the previous …ve years of monthly data. Abnormal Return is the di¤erence between the …rm's actual annual continuously compounded return and its expected return. We measure four types of Abnormal Returns: (1) CAPM-Adjusted, (2) 3-Factor-Adjusted (Fama-French 3 factors, i. e., the market, small …rm, and market-to-book factors), (3) 4-Factor-Adjusted (Fama-French 3 factors plus the momentum factor), and (4) Industry-Adjusted. Intra-year Return Reversal is measured by the di¤erence between the actual annual continuously compounded return and the return the …rm would have had if it had closed the year at its highest price during the given …scal year. All prices and returns are corrected for dividends and splits. The following table contains summary statistics for our key variables across the years 1994-2007 for our sample of …rms in the highest decile of imminent dilution, including only those …rms whose …scal years end in December. Deciles of imminent dilution are de…ned as follows: …rst, all …rm-year observations that have an Imminent Dilution value of zero (i.e., no dilution) are put into Decile 1 (2,730 observations or 19.2% of the entire sample); the remaining …rms in each year are then evenly distributed into Deciles 2-10 based on their values of Imminent Dilution of that year (close to 1,300 observations or about 9% of the sample in each decile). Shares Outstanding and Market Capitalization of each …rm's equity, Annual Dividend Yield, Book-to-Market ratio, and (Book) Leverage Ratio are calculated at the beginning of each …rm's …scal year. The intrinsic value of options is calculated at the beginning of each …rm's …scal year and given by the maximum of zero and the di¤erence between the stock price at the beginning of the …rm's …scal year t and the exercise price. This value, scaled by Market Capitalization and adjusted for whether Net Income is positive, is year t's contribution to diluted earnings per share computed according to FAS 128, and denoted below as Intrinsic Value of Options as a % of Market Capitalization. Imminent Dilution is the di¤erence between the Black-Scholes value of options granted in previous years that have vested (valued at the beginning of year t, assuming a one-year maturity) and the intrinsic value of the options at the beginning of year t, scaled by the …rm's market capitalization. Annual Simple/Continuously Compounded Return is the …rm's simple/continuously compounded return over the year t. The Beta is estimated from an OLS regression of the monthly continuously compounded excess return on the monthly continuously compounded excess return of the CRSP value-weighted index over 1994-2007. The Volatility for each …rm's stock returns is estimated using the previous …ve years of monthly data. Abnormal Return is the di¤erence between the …rm's actual annual continuously compounded return and its expected return. We measure four types of Abnormal Returns: (1) CAPM-Adjusted, (2) 3-Factor-Adjusted (Fama-French 3 factors, i.e., the market, small …rm, and market-to-book factors), (3) 4-Factor-Adjusted (Fama-French 3 factors plus the momentum factor), and (4) Industry-Adjusted. Intra-year Return Reversal is measured by the di¤erence between the actual annual continuously compounded return and the return the …rm would have had if it had closed the year at its highest price during the given …scal year. All prices and returns are corrected for dividends and splits. The following table contains Pearson correlations for the key variables across …scal years 1994-2007 for our estimation sample, including only those …rms whose …scal years end in December. The sample consists of 14,235 …rm-year observations. Imminent Dilution is the di¤erence between the Black-Scholes value of exercisable options and the intrinsic value of the options calculated at the beginning of the …rm's …scal year t, scaled by the …rm's market capitalization. The Intrinsic Value of exercisable options is given by the maximum of zero and the di¤erence between the stock price at the beginning of the …rm's …scal year t and the exercise price. This value, scaled by market capitalization and adjusted for whether Net Income is positive, is year t's contribution to diluted earnings per share computed according to FAS 128, and denoted below as
The Black-Scholes value is computed for options granted in previous years that have vested at the beginning of year t, assuming a one-year maturity. Annual Return is the …rm's continuously compounded return over the year t.
Book M kt is the …rm's book value of equity divided by its market value. Both
Book M kt and Market Capitalization of each …rm's equity are calculated at the beginning of each …rm's …scal year. The Volatility for each …rm's stock returns is estimated using the previous …ve years of monthly data. Intra-year Return Reversal is measured by the di¤erence between the actual annual continuously compounded return and the return the …rm would have had if it had closed the year at its highest price during the given …scal year. All prices and returns are corrected for dividends and splits. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% except Annual Returns and Return Reversals that involve continuously compounded returns. * denotes that the correlation coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. The dependent variable is the Intra-year Return Reversal, which is measured by the di¤erence between the actual annual continuously compounded return and the return the …rm would have had if it had closed the year at its high price during the given …scal year. All prices and returns are corrected for dividends and splits. The regressor of interest is Imminent Dilution, which is de…ned as the di¤erence between the Black-Scholes value and the intrinsic value of exercisable options at the beginning of the …scal year, scaled by the …rm's market capitalization. Control variables in the regressions include the Natural Logarithm of Market Capitalization, Book-to-Market Ratio, Volatility of the …rm's monthly stock returns of the previous …ve years, and Year and 2-digit SIC Industry Fixed E¤ects. All regressions are based on 13,426 …rm-year observations. Book-to-Market Ratio and Volatility are winsorized at 1% and 99%. In the third and fourth columns of results, Imminent Dilution (ID) is computed assuming all …rms have the median stock return volatility of 34%. The …rst and third columns report results from an OLS speci…cation with Huber-White sandwich standard errors in parentheses allowing for heteroskedasticity and correlated errors within …rms. The second and fourth columns report results for a Tobit speci…cation. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Table 6B : Intra-year Return Reversals and Imminent Dilution Before versus After the Policy Change
Imminent Dilution
The dependent variable is the Intra-year Return Reversal, which is measured by the di¤erence between the actual annual continuously compounded return and the return the …rm would have had if it had closed the year at its high price during the given …scal year. All prices and returns are corrected for dividends and splits. There are two regressors of interest: (i) Imminent Dilution, which is de…ned as the di¤erence between the Black-Scholes value and the intrinsic value of exercisable options at the beginning of the …scal year, scaled by the …rm's market capitalization, and (ii) the interaction term of Imminent Dilution (ID) and the Fiscal Year 2007 Indicator, denoted below as ID FYR 2007. Control variables in the regressions include the Natural Logarithm of Market Capitalization, Book-to-Market Ratio, Volatility of the …rm's monthly stock returns of the previous …ve years, and Year and 2-digit SIC Industry Fixed E¤ects. All regressions are based on 13,426 …rm-year observations. Book-to-Market Ratio and Volatility are winsorized at 1% and 99%. In the third and fourth columns of results, Imminent Dilution (ID) is computed assuming all …rms have the median stock return volatility of 34%. The …rst and third columns report results from an OLS speci…cation with Huber-White sandwich standard errors in parentheses allowing for heteroskedasticity and correlated errors within …rms. The second and fourth columns report results for a Tobit speci…cation. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
